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Messianic Freedom and the Secular Academy:
Educating the Affections in a
Technological Culture
P. Travis Kroeker
Professor and Chair, Department of Religious Studies
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario
In a recent article on religion and secularity in American culture,
Communio editor David Schindler elaborates the following credo: “I
believe with the ‘left’ that American religiosity typically harbors an
inadequate sense of and appreciation for the secular; and I believe
with the ‘right’ that American secularity has wrongly emancipated
itself from religion.”1 Schindler’s thesis is that a defective American
religiosity has largely set the terms for America’s defective secularity
(or secularism) and that the relation between these is mutual. The
defective religiosity is the conceptual division of the Creator from the
creation, leading to an untenable and reductive dualism – an extrinsic
relation between God and the saeculum that warrants the abstraction
of the religious realm of individual piety (the human will) from the
secular realm of nature and a purely scientistic reason.
This is, of course, not only an American malady. Schindler cites
the work of George Grant to further show how the secular liberalism
of the English-speaking world has become increasingly aligned with
the development of technology as the site where the value-generating
human will finds the value-neutral means for establishing control
over an indifferent nature. In his essay, “Thinking about Technology,”
Grant argues that “technology has become the unthought ontology of
our age” and that, far from being instrumentally “neutral,”
technological mastery imposes upon us a structure of choices and
public “goods” that threatens the very freedom it supposedly serves
and undermines the disciplined cultural practices that sustain justice
as a shared good.2 For Grant the computer serves as a symbol of this
often hidden determining power of technology in our culture, which
belies its supposed neutrality:
The phrase ‘the computer does not impose [on us the ways it should
be used]’ misleads, because it abstracts the computer from the
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destiny that was required for its making. Common sense may tell us
that the computer is an instrument, but it is an instrument from
within the destiny which does ‘impose’ itself upon us, and therefore
the computer does impose.3

What it imposes, among other things, are forms of community
that accommodate themselves to computer technologies and their
“progress.” Such a socially mediated conception of human destiny,
furthermore, hastens the global movement toward cultural
homogeneity and the gradual loss of a genuine pluralistic public life.
On this point Grant’s analysis is confirmed and deepened by the work
of Albert Borgmann: “Liberal democracy is enacted as technology. It
does not leave the question of the good life open but answers it along
technological lines.”4 As the responses to Wendell Berry’s
controversial Harper’s article, “Why I Am Not Going to Buy a
Computer,” indicate, even gently calling into critical question the
central icon of technological civilization will generate intensely
emotional moralistic responses (after all, the article is not entitled
“Why You Should Not Buy a Computer” or “Why the Computer is
Evil”). This leads Berry to tweak Harpers’ liberal-minded,
cosmopolitan readers: “I can only conclude that I have scratched the
skin of a technological fundamentalism that, like other
fundamentalisms, wishes to monopolize a whole society and,
therefore, cannot tolerate the smallest difference of opinion.”5
George Grant, in Technology and Empire, considers the
implications of this for “The University Curriculum”– a curriculum
increasingly focused upon the technological vision of rational
mastery. The unity of the sciences, he suggests, is increasingly
realized around this ideal of mastery – a subordination of the motive
of wonder to the motive of power. Augustine, in his famous manual
for the Christian liberal arts, De doctrina Christiana, has taught us to
attend above all to the question of motive in education. His rule for
interpreting ambiguous signs is to pay attention to “The motive in
using them and the way in which they are desired.”6 And to
subordinate the power of love to the love of power is for Augustine
the clearest indication of Faustian idolatry; it imitates the motives
modelled by the father of lies.
To this bleak vision of the secular academy I wish to counterpose
another vision, a vision not based upon any current slogan for
university reform. I wish rather to consider a messianic paradigm
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol31/iss2/4
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rooted in the humility of Jesus, as it was for Augustine. Only such a
radical spiritual revisioning of the meaning of human life as made to
desire God’s life itself as its end will enable us again to reconceive
(as Grant intended) our judgements about the essence of the
university – its curriculum. This I will try to begin to do in the second
part of my paper on “messianic freedom” in the academy, the mission
of which is to educate the human affections according to another
model of the human than technological mastery, namely, an ontology
of mystery. This model of the human will be guided by an
understanding “messianic faith” as expressed in the following two
definitions:
1. A modern Augustinian definition, Simone Weil: “We know
by means of our intelligence that what intelligence does not
comprehend is more real than what it does comprehend. Faith
is the experience that intelligence is enlightened by love.”7
2. A biblical definition, in Hebrews 11: “By faith we understand
that the world was created by the word of God, so that what
is seen was made out of things which do not appear.”
Hebrews goes on to talk about people of faith as sojourners,
strangers and exiles on the way toward a homeland that is
hoped for but not seen. The pathway to that homeland, says
Augustine in de Doctrina, is the purification of
understanding by love or caritas that travels along the “road
of the affections.”8 Only those whose intelligence is
enlightened by love will be capable of exercising good
judgement in understanding and using well the things of the
created world in which we live.
Learning has to do with the mind and the heart as well as the
body, and therefore with the shape that human lives, communities and
cultures will take. We dare not take this on as a process of narrowing
down, but rather as a liberating, expanding and integrative process
according to what Augustine calls the “divinely instituted rule of
caritas”:
“Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,” He said, and “thou shalt
love God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy
whole mind.” Thus all your thoughts and all your life and all your
understanding should be turned toward Him from whom you receive
these powers … [i.e.] that love of God which suffers no stream to be
led away from it by which it might be diminished.9
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What is required for this is a process of purgation of the eye of
the mind/heart so that its motives will be guided not by pride, fear and
error, but by humility, wisdom and truth. Only so will souls and
societies be able to dwell in peace and wellbeing.10

The University of Secular Cybernetics
What happens educationally when the basic metaphors of nature,
including human nature, are reduced to mechanistic process and
technical information? I begin with a quotation from the well-known
biologist, Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene: “We are survival
machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish
molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with
astonishment,” he gushes.11 In case there were any doubt that this is
no Socratic philosophical wonder, Dawkins clarifies his remark in his
philosophical apologia: “But that was no metaphor. I believe it is the
literal truth, provided key words are defined in the particular way
favored by biologists.”12 This of course makes a humanist curious
about the favored linguistic preferences of biologists – as it stands it
is an astonishing reductionism. Not only does it attribute a single
moral intentionality (selfishness) to the whole of life, when it could
equally be defined in terms of mutuality or reciprocity. It also
uncritically names us “survival machines” or “robot vehicles,” which
one should have thought would be strange metaphors for a biologist
to choose. And yet it is not uncommon. For biologists human nature
has become revealed as techno-genetic standing reserves.
Machines, of course, are humanly made, artificial, engineered,
usually not as a display of beauty or spiritual identity, but as
instruments – usually of control or procurement. Is it surprising that
our culture is increasingly taking on machine-like attributes when our
primary metaphors are mechanistic and instrumental? Increasingly
not only our industrial economy, but our politics and our aesthetics
take on the features of our primary linguistic metaphors. Why else
would people spend all that time and energy to make themselves look
like the very muscle-building machinery they use to get them there?
Why else are our lucrative fashion industries successfully marketing
the hairless, well-oiled body except that we literally are coming to see
ourselves not as animal creatures but increasingly as bio-mechanical
machines? And of course who wouldn’t be willing to become a
machine if it means avoiding a human death? The future markets in
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the cosmetic, therapeutic and functional enhancement of the human
machine (indeed the “nature machine”) are vast indeed – and a great
deal of research is being funded to exploit these opportunities as
central values in our public culture. To what extent is our technoscience guided by a morally-laden metaphysic of nature that denies
its own moral judgements and assumptions as such (by assuming the
mechanistic metaphor is objective rational description)? Of course,
machines are not moral agents; hence if we are machines, are we
moral agents? Is the effort to enhance our machine-like efficiency a
moral enterprise and, if so, what is the good it seeks and how will we
speak about it?
In order to explore these questions, the good of technological
research and development, we do well to examine the culturallinguistic history of modern science and its intimate connections with
technology and the mechanistic paradigm. The modern vision of
science has been closely tied to certain Baconian moral assumptions,
most notably the commitment to relieve and benefit the human
condition by liberating human beings from the constraints of nature,
and delivering control of nature, including human nature, into human
hands. “Knowledge is power,” said Bacon, and by this he meant the
power to generate, a power closely linking scientific research and
technical development. “Nature shall be put to the rack to compel her
to answer our questions,” the rack being humanly fashioned scientific
instruments that will crack the code of nature so as better to exploit
its natural resources for technological advancement. Bacon scoffed at
the wisdom of the classical moral traditions and their language of the
good, comparing it to pre-pubescent boyhood: “it can talk, but it
cannot generate.”13 It is worth paying some attention to this language
of “generating,” since etymologically it is linked to an important
family of words in our public culture: genius, engine/engineer,
gene/genetic – all linked to the Latin, gigno/gignere, to beget, and the
Greek, gignomai, to be born/come into being, language closely linked
to motives in our current academy (though we cannot explore this in
detail here).
Rather than focus here on particular ethical issues that are raised
by this language and the action it generates – patenting of genetic
information as intellectual property, various forms of genetic testing,
cloning, and the new benevolent eugenics entailed in the biotech
revolution – I want to consider the moral consequences of the shifts
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in language toward technological begetting. What happens when
basic biological nature comes to be seen as information, and
organisms as information processing machines whose capacities can
be progressively upgraded into increasingly efficient cybernetic
survival systems? If nature is merely an information code to be
cracked so that its various data might be reconfigured in endless
different patterns, how might we distinguish true from false,
benevolent from malevolent, healthy from harmful experiments,
innovations, and developments? If there is no “good” in nature,
including no moral goodness that can be commonly discerned, why
even bother with ethics in scientific research and technological
innovation?
Let us briefly consider a recent “posthuman” vision of
technological empire that has in effect eliminated ethics, Ray
Kurzweil’s The Age of Spiritual Machines.14 Ray Kurzweil is no
flake; his work in artificial intelligence and pattern recognition
technologies has led to the successful establishment of four high-tech
companies (devoted, among other things, to pattern recognition
technologies that aid the blind and the deaf), a number of influential
books, and a host of academic and other awards. He is in many ways
an icon of our culture’s commercial and research aspirations. What is
Kurzweil’s vision? In a nutshell it is this: “Computation is the essence
of order”.15 The evolutionary process that has begotten human
intelligence is effectively generating an increasingly efficient
information processing machine. Kurzweil is convinced that human
beings are the intermediate organic stage toward a new, cybernetic
stage of evolutionary development in which machine technology will
eventually “take full control of its own progression”.16 This is indeed
what human intelligence and consciousness really is once we get past
“hard-to-define questions such as human dignity”.17 While the
Human Genome Project is important as a scanning operation of DNA
codes, it will ultimately be superseded by machine intelligence,
according to what Kurzweil calls the “Law of Accelerating Returns”
which interprets all reality on the model of increasingly complex
information processing. For intelligent organisms to adapt
themselves to a changing natural – read “machine”– environment, in
order to keep up with and maintain their evolutionary advantage,
human beings will of necessity turn themselves into machines,
gradually at first through genetic therapies, bio-enhancement and
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol31/iss2/4
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porting our brains to computer intelligence. But eventually we will
have to realize that “DNA-based evolution will eventually have to be
abandoned” because “organisms created through DNA-based
evolution are stuck with an extremely plodding type of circuitry”.18
Kurzweil’s vision ends with the claim that “extremely little of the
stuff on Earth is devoted to useful computation. This is even more
true when we consider all of the dumb matter in the Earth’s midst”.19
The aim of all life is to exploit nature for its computational
intelligence (Kurzweil’s “spirituality”), which will transform life into
a shared machine consciousness, a posthuman virtual reality.
Kurzweil’s book is filled with examples of what may be achieved
through this bio-technological revolution, this “road paved with gold
… full of benefits that we’re never going to resist”.20 He is fond of
speculating on the sexual possibilities that will open up when freed
from the constraints of biological generation and conventional social
norms. Sexual and spiritual activities can be reduced to information
processing, not complex personal relations sustained through time or
in nature, not educated through disciplined commitments between
persons. Sex is merely the episodic manipulation of electronic data.
Kurzweil finds it in him to celebrate the technological possibilities of
virtual sex of every kind, which will no longer require moral censure
because now safely detached from embodied nature. He imagines his
fourth grade son’s ability to undress his fourth grade teacher – and
manipulate her in any way he desires – without affecting her; he
imagines the ability to indulge many lovers at once, pleasuring
himself by clicking on innumerable sites and partners at the same
time (though I suppose no real clicking will eventually be required).
So too the spiritual arts (music, poetry, painting) can easily be
replicated by computer technology, and unfortunately Kurzweil
cannot restrain himself from giving examples of his own design. The
commodities on offer are at about the same level of moral wisdom
and emotional intelligence as the fourth grade sexual fantasies. We
are now literally generating sex for pre-pubescent boys, who no
longer need either to talk or to generate.
How is it that our human quest for liberation and happiness ends
up in such a tawdry and dehumanizing vision of disembodiment –
that is nevertheless celebrated as the benevolent salvation of the
future? I suggest it has something to do with the idea that we will
magically crack the code of life through the collection of data. This
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is a Faustian bargain. Data lacks sanctity and goodness; to be sure, it
takes attention away from our moral and spiritual sensibilities which
are developed and communicated through a different sort of language
– the language of symbol, narrative and the ordering of love, justice,
beauty, and goodness. This classical moral language is attuned to a
different kind of knowing than is the instrumental procurement and
processing of data, and it is important to recognise this
philosophically if we are to preserve any moral notion of secular
education as a shared rational language that discloses to us spiritually
and culturally who we are.
What we need in the first place, then, is an account of spiritual
causality rooted in the language of poetic, dramatic experience. This
too is an academic and public science that considers generation, as
Plato envisioned it more than two millennia ago, but not so much a
biological or technological begetting as spiritual generation, an
account of why things come into being and exist as they do. In his
dialogue, the Phaedo, Plato has Socrates give an account of why one
must move beyond physical, mechanical, and formal causality in
order to account for human motivation and judgement.21 In order to
do this it is necessary to consider the ordering power of the good,
“which must embrace and hold together all things.”22 And the good,
as Socrates puts it in the Republic, is “beyond being, exceeding it in
dignity and power,” a transcendent measure that cannot be humanly
manipulated, that can be discerned only by the properly ordered
organon of the soul.23 An account of that proper ordering is what
ethics is. For this we need another kind of generative language and
education, one that examines moral character and spiritual meaning
in a non-instrumentalist but nevertheless rational manner. The
science of spiritual generation will be different from the science of
biological generation or technological begetting, though not
unrelated to it.
However, which moral language, tradition, and symbolism will
we use in a secular pluralistic society by which to adjudicate the
disputes? As in the other rational sciences, there is no shortcut that
gets around the particularity and diversity of what we encounter.
Spiritual and moral symbols are not private or individual
constructions but nor are they universal abstractions – they are found
in particular texts and traditions that can be studied seriously as
representations of shared cultural and human experiences. When we
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examine them closely we will find some striking points of
communication within the diversity. Without the resources and
insights provided by such disciplined inquiry and serious public
conversation, we will be ill-equipped to answer the Ray Kurzweils of
the world, who tar any opposition with the same brush: antiscientific, anti-technological Luddism. Of course, on the classical
moral principle that it is better to suffer harm than to cause it, I am
quite ready to champion the Luddites over Kurzweil. But it is a sign
of the dangerously uncritical totalitarianism of Kurzweil and his ilk
that any resistance is considered intolerant and intolerable, and
dismissed with an epithet.24
It is clear to me that our public conversation about ethics, both in
the university and in the wider society, is not adequate and this leaves
us ill-equipped to understand, never mind address, the moral
quandaries that are raised by our growing technological capacities
and their commercial applications (which are being pursued at full
speed). This represents an opportunity in our culture and within the
academy in particular, not for the imposition of new religious or
moral orthodoxies in place of prevailing secularist and technicist
ones, but for the serious conversation between the cultural sciences
and religious moral traditions about the range of assumptions
concerning nature and human nature that orient our thought and
action. At its liberal best, secular has not meant the anti-religious
privatization of religious and moral discourse, but rather that no one
religious tradition or moral position will be uncritically privileged as
the only one (just as in natural science neither theoretical nor
commercial agendas should be so privileged). The assumption at its
best of secular pluralism is precisely that open, critical discussion of
the variety of spiritual symbols and traditions can enhance the
understanding and experience of all. This is indeed what the liberal
secular academy needs to relearn from its own founding “faith”
traditions.
Why? Not least because openness and plurality, respect for
difference and the shared exploration of the meaning of reality, are
themselves particular spiritual qualities and disciplines that can be
lost when they are no longer understood and cultivated. These
qualities, rooted in a sense of the spiritual and moral dignity not only
of human beings but of the natural world in general, embody the trust
that truth about our shared reality can be discovered through humble
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exploration that will also respect the limits of our different forms of
knowing. Such disciplined exploration and shared dialogue, not
commercial utility or self-interested intellectual conquest, is the
moral heart of the university as a public institution. Moral meaning is
best discovered and communicated not in generic abstractions or
formal codes that avoid discussion of the particular spiritual and
moral commitments of real human beings, but that calls these
commitments and symbols to public account in terms of their
theoretical and applied implications.

Messianic Freedom and the Affections
In the remainder of this paper I shall explore briefly the possibility of
a messianic paradigm that addresses the question of education in the
secular pluralist academy quite differently from the approach
displayed in technological globalization. By calling the paradigm
“messianic” I am of course being deliberately provocative, as it is
precisely the messianic forms of religion that have been judged to be
dangerously apocalyptic by modern liberal theories. No doubt so
some have been.25 However it is also the case that the first theory of
the saeculum in Western political thought was developed precisely
within an apocalyptic messianic understanding of history and
politics, Augustine’s City of God.26 I have also suggested that the
notions of neutral technology and rational mastery that underlie
current conceptions and embodiments of the secular are themselves
dangerously totalitarian, exclusivist and violent even while hidden
beneath the veneer of progressivist liberal assumptions. The
challenge is how messianic faith might engage a secular public realm
of technological empire in constructively critical terms without
accommodating itself to its colonizing and monolithic moral
ontology.
We may begin by recalling some of the biblical images related to
the “people of faith”: strangers, exiles, sojourners – a people in
“diaspora.” These images help envision how messianic faith faces the
challenges of a pluralistic, multi-cultural world – not as established or
privileged rulers of the domain, but as itinerant servants on
pilgrimage who need certain portable skills that enable them to “seek
the shalom of the people to whom you are being sent, for in its
shalom you will find your shalom” (Jeremiah 29, Jeremiah’s advice
to the people being exiled to the enemy empire, Babylon). Such a
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way of life requires the building up of certain virtues: humility above
all, as exemplified in Jesus whom Hebrews 12 calls the “pioneer and
perfecter of faith.” It will also require openness to new and different
experiences and paradigms, welcoming strangers, seeing leadership
as servanthood, being willing to engage the difficult, polyglot
disciplines of interpreting one’s identity and story in new cultural
forms and contexts. This is true not only in faith communities; it is
also true in the university, as a “diaspora institution” devoted to
practices not to be identified with any particular earthly political
regime. The academy too was the creation of a diaspora movement
from the Greek polis prompted by the revelation of something new in
Socrates, who emphasized the importance of educating our desires
theologically so as to be liberated from the lie in the soul about the
things that are.
In terms of an understanding of education in our own time, this
means first of all a liberation from the idolotry of literalism entailed
in the “unthought ontology” of technological culture. John Henry
Newman, following Augustine and Plato, states: “University
Teaching without Theology is simply unphilosophical.”27 At issue
here is the question of truth in its relatedness, where wholeness is
more than the sum of its factual parts. A truly philosophical habit of
mind that gets us beyond the “viewiness” of undisciplined opining
and the passive reception of images28 must bring human agency and
judgement back into the scientific process. Otherwise we will end up
in the superstitious literalism that now threatens to overwhelm the
modern university (as Newman already anticipated) where only
external causes are allowed to count in rational explanation. Newman
points out that in such a university it would not be the sciences which
were untrue, but the so-called knowledges literally “unreal”–
deciding on facts by means of narrow methods and theories. Such a
university is no longer teaching liberal knowledge but only a narrowminded bigotry (50). A true university will require at its center a
science that seeks a true account of the soul and its principles of
motion in a spiritually ordered cosmos. It is not accidental that Plato
coined the term “theology” in Book II of the Republic in considering
why education is required to liberate enslaved citizens from civic lies
that bind them in ugly, violent caves. The theological question is
entailed in the central question of a liberal, philosophical education:
How should we speak the truth about the good so as to distinguish
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between a good life and a bad one (and to avoid the lie in the soul
about the things that are)?
Such a process of liberation is articulated in Augustine’s de
doctrina, where interpretation is most properly founded upon the rule
of faith, none other than the principle of caritas that spiritually orients
the human understanding to the “good beyond being”. Here is what
Augustine says about the state of enslavement: “There is a miserable
servitude of the soul in this habit of taking signs for things, so that
one is not able to raise the eye of the mind above things that are
corporal and created to drink in eternal light.”29 The process of being
liberated from such a servitude is no easy thing, but it is a process, a
“turning” or “conversion” motivating every university worthy of the
name: universitas, literally turned toward wholeness. It is ultimately,
as Augustine put it, a return to the wisdom that one loves in the love
of any particular thing that one therefore tries to understand, to know.
But it is also a process characterised by imitation – we humans are
creatures of imitation, we learn by imitating examples that move us.
This of course is the whole meaning and power of “authority.” We
humans do not invent ourselves de novo – we are born into the world
only to enter through speech “more deeply into the stormy society of
human life” and in this society we learn our motives, we have our
desires shaped.30 (Confessions I, viii, 13).
Augustine has some telling things to say about his teachers as
models of imitation in the academic game: above all they focused on
the appearance of loquacity and the glory of winning in verbal
competition. In this regard, they were experts in the cultivation of
affectation and style, not nurturing the affections on truth and
substantive wisdom. Indeed they were masters of hypocrisy, attuned
only to the visible and external, punishing the boys for their vanity
and pleasure-seeking even while their disciplines and adult
conventions were dedicated to the very same ends. Not only were
these educational authorities corrupt, but so also the literary examples
they taught – the Greek and Latin classics whose heroes displayed
deception, violence and fornication as models of success. While
Scripture carries a much different authority than do Homer and
Virgil, Augustine does not dismiss the study of literary classics but
submits them to the scrutiny of a higher authority – divine wisdom.
So also, then, does the messianic teaching authority of Jesus present
us with a challenging model that turns the techniques and methods of
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rhetoric and intellectual inquiry to fundamentally different purposes.
Augustine characterises the distinctiveness of this authority in terms
of what was lacking in the pagan philosophers: humility and tears of
confession. For Augustine to profess means to confess before others
and thus to offer a model of imitation founded on humility.
Mark’s gospel clearly ties Jesus’ messianic authority – a public
and political as well as religious and moral authority – to John the
Baptist. The first word of this earliest of the four gospels is arche,
“the beginning” of the good news of Jesus the Messiah, a new
beginning signalled as a new creation tied to the appearance of the
Messiah, but Mark immediately sets another tone ringing from the
prophet Isaiah. Like Isaiah, Mark sees the new beginning as taking
place not in the political center in Jerusalem but rather in the
wilderness, where the people learn to walk the unconventional ways
of justice and mercy. Hence the prophetic importance of John the
Baptist. John has no school, no sophisticated organization, no
institutional location or authorization or credentials – yet he will
prepare the messianic way. To begin to prepare this way means letting
go, “repenting” of closed conventional markers about insiders and
outsiders, the elite and the rabble, the respectable and the vulgar. John
preaches renunciation of all closed claims and his rite of baptism is
intended to open up the possibility of a completely new beginning.
This baptism is not a special ritual code related to a creed and an
insider community; it is a radical leveling and calls only for a
complete turnaround of one’s life.
Like Elijah, the prophetic judge of king and court who was
continually viewed as a political danger, John the Baptist is no lapdog
to power. Despite the fact that “all the people of Jerusalem” go out to
see him and be baptized in the river Jordan, he remains a threat
especially to the religious and political establishment and is
eventually arrested by King Herod (Mark 6). Clearly, then, when
John says “After me comes one who is mightier than I, the thong of
whose sandals I am not worthy to stoop down and untie,” he does not
mean Herod, though Herod would no doubt think so. Rather he is
referring to an unknown man from hinterland Nazareth whose career
will be very like his own and with whom he will intersect at strategic
moments in Mark’s gospel. That John and Jesus are no power rivals,
however, is made evident when, far from requiring John to stoop
before him, Jesus invites John to baptize him in the river Jordan.
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2006
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Does the Messiah need to be baptized? Perhaps it is best to reason not
the need, but the answer appears to be yes – this paradigm entails the
complete dispossession of privilege. After this Jesus too is “driven
out into the wilderness” by the Spirit and wrestles with temptations
concerning power and authority.
It is here that the parallels and intersections between Jesus and
the Baptist begin. Jesus’ public ministry begins, Mark tells us, when
John is arrested by Herod, and he begins to preach the same message
as John: “the kingdom of God is at hand; repent and believe in the
good news.” Later (Mark 11) when Jesus goes to Jerusalem and is
questioned about his authority by the religious leaders he ties his
authority to John’s baptism, which traps these leaders. Jesus asks
them, “Was the baptism of John from heaven or of human origin?
And they argued with one another, “If we say ‘From heaven,’ he will
say, ‘Why then did you not believe him?’ But shall we say ‘Of human
origin?’ – they were afraid of the people, for all held that John was a
real prophet.” By responding in this way these leaders prove
themselves characteristic of all conventional authority, which takes
its cues from human beings, whose desires are shaped by the power
games that accord status and respect through rivalry and domination.
This is not the power that authorizes and motivates either John or
Jesus, and this is at the heart of the good news which reshapes desire
and establishes a very different line of authority, the way of the
Messiah.
The messianic religious community displayed in the New
Testament establishes this pattern of authority and of rebuilding the
secular not through control of the dominant centers of social and
intellectual power but by modeling a different path of community
building as cultural service from below. The faith identity borne by
the messianic community is not a new noetic universalism that
somehow transcends or escapes particularity and difference. Indeed it
is not to be related to a form of universal “knowing” of any sort (“if
anyone imagines that he knows something, he does not yet know as
he ought to know”). It is rather an identity “in Messiah” that seeks the
perfection of love, not in the domination or possession of any part,
but in the apocalyptic transformation of all partial things to their
mutual completion in divine love. This transformation occurs in the
messianic body conformed through baptism to the messianic mind
that willingly empties itself in order to serve the other, a pattern of
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radical humility. It is a pattern that can only be spiritually discerned,
even though it is being enacted in the bodily realm that is “passing
away,” and therefore may appear as failure – as Paul emphatically
insists in I Corinthians 1, scandalously relating the messianic calling
to the foolish power of the cross that is mysteriously related to divine
power and wisdom depicted not as ontological plenitude but as
emptiness: “God chose what is low and despised in the world, even
things that are not (ta me onta) in order to bring to nothing ta onta (the
things that are).” It is, finally, a pattern that can be described as
sacramental or parabolic in which the excess of the whole may be
discerned within the particular part that is selflessly and in loving use
of the world bearing witness to its hidden and sustaining divine life.
To live in this way would be to restore secularity, including the
secular university, to its truest ontological meaning – its full but not
self-sufficient significance as the site where God is becoming “in
Messiah” ta panta en pasin (“all in all”).
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